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Reasoning with the Charter
Leon E. Trakman
Butterworths Canada Ltd. 1991, pp.239
Reasoning with the Charter, a critique of the current "liberalist"
interpretation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Through
deconstruction of main judicial interpretations of the Charter Professor
Trakman reconstructs the interpretative process to reveal the Charter's
potential for positive action.
Professor Trakman considers the attempts by the judiciary to
limit interpretations of the Charter to traditional negative rights. He
suggests that notwithstanding this limitation, these interpretations
often reveal the potential for a positive construction within the Charter.
Further, Professor Trakman criticizes judges for denying their political
roles in society and demonstrates how judges do, in fact, exercise
political influence. These philosophical underpinnings are extensively
explored.
Professor Trakman proposes a communitarian conception of
liberty which does not abolish Charter liberalism, but puts it in its place
by treating "private rights as a subset of the social sphere" .1 Individual
rights, he argues, cannot be, and in reality are not separable from their
social milieu. Thus, Professor Trakman seeks "community through
communication" whereby groups are acknowledged as having a distinct
role apart from government and the individual. To encourage "communicative discourse" between the parts, in their social context, with the
Charter as the focus, is "to seek political harmony among diverse
peoples".2
This is an ambitious task. Reinterpreting the Charter to provide
"discourse" to seek "political harmony", however, is not the book's main
thrust. Except for the occasional diversion into these broader goals,
Professor Trakman's focus is on the fallacies and inconsistencies of
current judicial interpretation of Charter rights.
A difficulty in following Professor Trakman's train of thought
lies in the lack of concrete development of case law and societal issues.
The general style throughout the book is to state very specific conclusions without guiding the reader through his process of reaching these
conclusions. For example, in Chapter Two, Professor Trakman attempts
to develop a theme of group-group interaction to refute the traditional
liberalist state-individual dichotomy:
No group oflitigants, blacks, women or aboriginal people, can personalize collective attitudes towards sex,
race and religion without also affecting the social climate around them ... They affect prayer ... They encompass special interest groups ... Within this wider sphere,
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social interests move beyond adverse relations ... they
entertain public perceptions of hunger, employment ...
Thus, the pregnant woman's right not to give birth
hinges as much upon the perceived availability of safe
and humane abortion facilities as upon the right to foetal
life itself. 3
Although the statements are by no means substantively incorrect, they do contain perspectives which need a context in order for the
reader to fully appreciate them. The reader might like to know how or
why the author came to a particular societal example, or why he uses it
in a specific circumstance. Without any such elaboration, the technique
of drawing on these examples is more distracting than illuminating.
An exception to, and support of, this criticism is the chapter
entitled "Morgentaler as Illustration"4 in which Professor Trakman
grounds his critique in a review of the 1988 Supreme Court of Canada
decision R. v. Morgentaler. Although he reiterates many of the statements made earlier in the book, this chapter does provide an effective
case illustration of his critique of current judicial interpretation of the

Charter.
Where Professor Trakman does not attempt to allude to societal
examples in a random manner his ideas are persuasive. For example, in
a subsection to Chapter Three entitled "Rights as Hierarchy"5 he
critiques judicial interpretation of Charter rights as producing hierarchical relationships between groups and the individual. His argument
establishes why courts should not seek this interpretative process. This
analysis forgoes the distractions of random allusions to undeveloped
issues and is all the more compelling for being an uncluttered statement
of his ideas.
On a more substantive level, Professor Trakman does not respond to prevalent criticism of the system of rights as it exists in the
Charter. His basic premise is that the rights themselves are valid. This
is made clear by his constant focus on the interpretative process as
engaged by the judiciary rather than on an evaluation of the rights as
they stand within the Charter. Clearly, Professor Trakman's purpose is
not to deconstruct the rights themselves. What he does not dispel
however, is the possibility that his critique of the interpretative process
may more properly be, in fact, a critique of the rights on which that
interpretative process is based.
For the purposes of the book, it might be that a response to
criticisms of the system of rights as it exists within the Charter is not
essential. Professor Trakman's apparent concern is not to move away
entirely from a system of rights, but rather to reinterpret it so that it
shifts away from the Western liberalist tradition. Yet, Reasoning with
the Charter is situated within the Canadian context and, as such,
requires a response to this fundamental criticism. The author does
allude to the issue where he states "the rights discourse, undoubtedly, is
alien to some". 6 It is possible that the construction of the rights as they
exist within the Charter is not amenable to take account of certain
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experiences in Canadian society. Professor Mary Ellen Turpel, for
example, in "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretative Monopolies, Cultural Differences", states:
It is difficult for me to see any potential for sensitivity to
the cultural differences of Aboriginal peoples in the
constitutional rights paradigm. I could imagine a strong
defence argument being developed under section 25 to
the effect that, in the light of cultural differences, Aboriginal peoples are immune from Charter jurisprudence
or interpretation. The Charter according to this argument, does not extend to them because of the incommensurability of the conceptual framework of the rights
paradigm.7
Perhaps, within the Canadian context, ProfessorTrakman could
have directly responded to this viewpoint and specifically stated how his
"communicative discourse", as based on a Western liberalist document,
would operate to include those to whom the system ofrights is traditionally uninclusive.
Above all else, the book is a strong critique of the current judicial
interpretation of the Charter. It forms the basis for compelling interpretative reconstruction. Unfortunately, although Professor Trakman
provides some reconstruction he shies away from concretely examining
his conceptions of community and communicative discourse through the
Charter. Reasoning with the Charter is thought provoking, but, if it had
more bravely pursued its own potential for "communicative discourse" it
would be all the more satisfying.
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